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The Influence of Public Policy on Health, Wealth and Mortality 
Abstract 
In this project we extend an augmented lifecycle model, incorporating a Grossman-style model 
of health capital, to enhance understanding of factors influencing consumption, wealth and 
health. We develop three primary results when using the model to explore the effects of stylized 
versions of Medicare and Social Security on wealth and longevity. First, our model calibration 
implies consumption and health are complements. As health depreciates with age, households 
will get less utility from consumption than would be in the case of a lifecycle model that does not 
endogenize health. Second, it appears that forward-looking households, when confronted by a 
substantially reduced safety net, will respond by reducing consumption and by reducing their 
health investment and therefore longevity. Third, there is a potentially important difference 
between short- and long- run responses to policy. 
Understanding of the process through which life span and quality of life are produced and 
how this affects the living standards of the elderly is a central challenge of social science 
research. At one level, the potential mechanisms are clear and can, at the risk of 
oversimplification, be placed into three categories. First, adverse health shocks may affect the 
ability to work successfully in the labor market, and hence health affects income. Second, while 
the link is perhaps less obvious, income may affect health. There are many potential pathways: 
high income households, for example, may invest more than others in health-producing activities 
(such as diet or exercise) and may have better access to health care. Third, unobserved factors 
may contribute to health and income. Patient people (those with low discount rates), for example, 
may be willing to make long-term investments in health and education. Even if people have 
identical discount rates, there are undoubtedly idiosyncratic differences across people in their 
ability to maintain and improve health. 
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 The varied mechanisms that result in a given individual’s health and income (and material 
well-being) are complex.  To better understand the links between health, wealth and aging, we 
develop a dynamic model of household behavior that blends the model of health capital and 
production developed by Grossman (1972) and an augmented lifecycle model similar to Scholz, 
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006).  Incorporating health into a lifecycle model of wealth 
accumulation is useful.  Households may respond to adverse income or health shocks or to 
changes in government policy by adjusting health investment as well as consumption.  Changes 
in health investment can alter individuals’ health and have longer-run implications for mortality.  
To explore these links, however, a behavioral model of household decision-making is needed.   
 Given exogenous household income, we model the intertemporal consumption/saving 
decisions and health investments that households make.  These adjust to changes in the policy 
and institutional environment.  By modeling health production, we also model longevity.  
Longevity is an excellent outcome to use when matching model implications with data, since a 
person’s health is difficult to assess with observational data.  Indeed, this difficulty underlies 
many of the most interesting asymmetric information problems in the economics of health and 
insurance.  Death, however, is readily apparent.  Many of our policy experiments, therefore, 
focus on mortality or longevity as a central outcome of interest.  It is likely, however, that the 
effects of policy on health work in similar directions.  A policy that enhances longevity is also 
likely to enhance health. 
 We examine the effects of Social Security reforms on wealth, health, and longevity in our 
policy simulations.  By explicitly modeling health production, we also provide insights into the 
determinants of health and factors that affect life-tables (and therefore, Social Security solvency).  
The model allows us to study the interactions between consumption/saving decisions and the 
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production of health capital.  The model is well-suited for examining the implications of changes 
to the health safety net on longevity and hence Social Security financing.   
 Our model matches quite closely the joint distribution of medical expenditures and wealth 
over time observed in data.  It is perhaps not surprising that we can do that for the average 
household in the sample, since we calibrate selected underlying behavioral parameters to the 
behavior of the average (or mean) household in the sample.  It is considerably more striking that 
we match behavior in the tails of the distribution and, more broadly, that we do a reasonable job 
matching behavior household-by-household after simply calibrating the model to behavior of the 
average household. 
 Our economic model of health and wealth is similar to Scholz and Seshadri (2010), though 
we have made several extensions and improvements.  The two most important are:  we improve 
our modeling of health insurance, and we improve the data used in the underlying analysis.  In 
our previously funded work, we did not allow households to have changes in insurance status 
before and after age 65.  For example, if a household had employer-provided insurance during 
their working life, they retained that status in retirement.  This modeling simplification reduced 
the size of the state space that we needed to solve for our dynamic programming problem, 
reducing substantially (by a factor of four) the time needed to solve the model.   Now, we 
incorporate insurance status as a state variable, which allows households to transition to our 
stylized version of the Medicare program when they reach age 65. 
 In prior work we also made use of a potentially suspect measure of total medical expenses 
included in one version of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  While we have reasonable 
confidence in reported out-of-pocket medical expenses in the HRS, total expenses are  
considerably more difficult for a household to report accurately in an interview survey.  In this 
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draft we use moments for total medical expenses by age, cross-classified by insurance status, 
drawn from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), to calibrate parameters that map 
out-of-pocket expenses into total expenses.  We also updated and improved all input data for the 
model, including our empirical models of taxation, transfers, and expectations (about future 
earnings, health shocks and pensions).  We examine a representative sample of households born 
before 1954.  And unlike our prior work, we examine how health and consumption responds to 
changes in health insurance and Social Security arrangements. 
 Three primary themes emerge from this project.  First, we model health and consumption in 
a flexible way.  As households age, health and consumption could be substitutes.  As health 
diminishes with age, households could consume more to offset their diminished health capital.  
This might occur, for example, through larger home-health expenditures.  Alternatively, health 
and consumption could be complements.  Households in poor health may experience diminished 
utility from consumption.  If health and consumption are complements, forward-looking 
households will recognize this, shifting consumption to earlier ages where the utility gained from 
consumption would be higher.  Our analysis suggests consumption and health are complements 
in preferences. 
 Second, modeling health investment and consumption broadens the scope of potential 
household responses to policy.  Most numerical models of life-cycle consumption do not model 
health investments.  Safety net cuts, therefore, will typically generate a precautionary saving 
response, where households consume less and save more to self-insure for potential future 
adverse shocks.  Modeling health investment introduces a second margin of adjustment.  Rather 
than sharply dropping consumption, households, when confronted by a substantially reduced 
safety net, might respond both by reducing consumption and by reducing their health investment.  
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Indeed, in some very poor countries, it does not appear that households engage in substantial 
precautionary saving.  Instead, they largely run down their health capital.  Our model illustrates 
these possibilities in a model calibrated to the U.S. economy. 
 Third, there is a potentially important difference between short- and long-run responses to 
policy.  Because health capital is largely determined by the time an individual reaches retirement, 
for example, our results imply there would be only negligible effects on mortality rates of 
eliminating Medicare in the first 10 years following the unanticipated removal of the program.  
Long-run adjustments to changes in the institutional environment can be substantial, however.  
In the Medicare application, households will consume less and do more buffer stock saving, self-
insuring after losing Medicare.  The self-insurance is not enough to offset the long-run effects of 
eliminating Medicare.  The result is that households will both consume less and die earlier when 
Medicare is eliminated.  The model with endogenous health mitigates the effects of changes in 
social insurance on consumption relative to standard lifecycle models. 
I.  Background 
 We, of course, are not the first to examine the links between health, consumption, and 
wealth.  Clear discussions are given in Smith (2005) and Case and Deaton (2005) and by many 
others.  More closely related to our work is an important set of papers, including Palumbo 
(1999); Kopecky and Koreshkova (2009); and De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) that document 
the substantial role that late-in-life health shocks, including nursing home expenses and social 
insurance, play in old age wealth decumulation.  While these papers offer valuable insights, they 
fall short of capturing the varied ways that health and consumption interact in the Grossman 
framework.  In particular, except for the model with exogenous medical expense shocks in 
Section 9 of De Nardi, French and Jones (2010), the only response that households have to the 
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realization of medical expense shocks in these models is to alter consumption. Death occurs 
through the application of life tables with random longevity draws. 1   
 De Nardi, French and Jones (2010) estimate key structural parameters of an intertemporal 
consumption model with endogenous health investment.  They use a sample of single individuals 
age 70 and over. They find that endogenizing medical expense shocks has little effect on their 
results.  They write, "In sum, the endogenous medical expense model confirms and reinforces 
our conclusion that medical expenses are a major saving motive and that social insurance affects 
the saving of the income-rich as well as that of the income-poor.  Our main findings appear 
robust to the way in which we model the medical expense decision."   They point out that health 
capital may be well-formed by prior decisions and expenditures by the time an individual reaches 
age 70.   
 Our work builds on the innovative endogenous medical expense model of De Nardi, French 
and Jones (2010).  We model the process of health production starting at the beginning of 
working life.  We take a more expansive view than prior work of health investments, in that we 
allow health to be affected by investments of time as well as money.  With our model, we study 
the tradeoff between consumption and health investments on longevity (and health status) and 
consumption. 
HRS Data on Earnings, Wealth, Health and Longevity 
 We use data from all waves of the 1992-2008 Health and Retirement Study.  The sample 
includes households from the AHEAD cohort, born before 1924; Children of Depression Age 
1 Two related papers model intertemporal consumption decisions and include health in the utility function in a 
manner similar to our approach.  Fonseca, Michaud, Galama, and Kapteyn (2009) write down a model similar to 
ours and solve the decision problem for 1,500 representative households.  Consumption and health are separable in 
utility in their model and the focus of their work is on explaining the causes behind the increases in health spending 
and life expectancy between 1965-2005.  Yogo (2009) solves a model similar to ours for retired, single women over 
65 to examine portfolio choice and annuitization in retirement.   
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(CODA) cohort, born between 1924 and 1930; the original HRS cohort, born between 1931 and 
1941; the War Baby cohort, born between 1942 and 1947; and the Early Baby Boomers, born 
between 1948 and 1953.  The sample is a representative, randomly stratified sample of U.S. 
households born before 1954.  The HRS modestly oversamples blacks, Hispanics, and 
Floridians.   
Self-Reported Health and Exercise Decline with Age 
 The descriptive data in the HRS are consistent with the issues raised in the introduction.  It 
is no surprise, of course, that health capital depreciates.  Figure 1a shows the evidence from the 
2008 wave of the HRS.  The data are disaggregated by the five HRS cohorts.  Forty-six percent 
of the youngest group members, the early boomers, are in very good or excellent health.  Only 24 
percent of the oldest group members, the AHEAD cohort, are in very good or excellent health.  
Thirty-nine percent are in fair or poor health, while only 25 percent of the early boomers are in 
fair or poor health.  The effects are nearly monotonic with age. 
 While the direction of causality is not clear, similar patterns hold for exercise (as shown in 
Figure 1b).  Early boomers are more than twice as likely (at 34 percent) than their AHEAD 
counterparts (16 percent) to engage in moderate exercise every day or vigorous exercise at least 
once per week.  They are three times less likely (at 14 percent) than their AHEAD counterparts 
(42 percent) to never or rarely exercise.  The evidence on exercise, health and age coupled with 
the well-known fact that it is difficult to observe direct links between medical expenditure and 
health (the so-called “flat of the curve medicine”), influences the way we model health 
production.2  Factors such as time spent exercising, smoking decisions, and diet appear to play a 
2 Card, Dobkin, Maestas (2008), for example, is one of a small number of studies that find expenditures are 
positively correlated with survival.  Their work is based on a very large sample of people admitted to emergency 
rooms in California:  they find the positive effects of spending apply to a small subset of the conditions that lead 
people to show up in emergency rooms.  Doyle (2010) shows that men who have heart attacks when vacationing in 
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not-insignificant role in determining health status and hence longevity.  We take a parsimonious 
approach to modeling health by monetizing all health-producing activities. For working 
households, time spent in exercise therefore can be thought of as reducing hours available for 
income-producing opportunities and therefore reducing consumption possibilities. 
The Positive Health-Income and Health-Wealth Relationship 
 Work with the HRS would make little sense if it did not reflect the typical positive 
relationship between measures of economic affluence – in our case, lifetime income and net 
worth – and self-reported health status.  Figures 2a and 2b show the HRS data are consistent with 
a strong, positive relationship between lifetime income quintiles and self-reported health (Figure 
2a) and net worth quintiles and self-reported health (Figure 2b). 
Longevity and Lifetime Income for Men and Women 
 There is a strong relationship between lifetime income and survival in the HRS.  To show 
this, we restrict the sample to birth years that, in principle, would allow someone to reach a 
specific age by the last year of HRS data we have available, 2008.  So, for example, when we 
look at patterns of ten-year survival from age 60 to age 70, we restrict the sample to those born 
before 1938.  To mitigate the problem of survivor bias we also limit the sample to respondents 
who were first interviewed prior to turning 60.  When we look at survival to age 85, we condition 
the sample to those born before 1923 and drop those who were older than 75 in the year they 
entered the HRS sample.  At this stage of our analysis, we also restrict the sample to couples 
where at least one member allowed researchers to gain access to their Social Security earnings 
records (under tightly controlled conditions).  Our samples for survival to age 70 has 4,707 
individuals, our sample for survival to age 85 has 1,865 individuals. 
Florida have higher survival probabilities if they end up being served by high- rather than low-expenditure hospitals.  
Numerous studies, however, suggest significant portions of medical expenditures have little discernible effect on 
health. 
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 Figure 3a shows our results on survival probabilities to age 70, tabulated by lifetime income 
quintile.  For men, the survival probabilities increase monotonically with lifetime income, from 
74 percent for those in the lowest lifetime income quintile to 89 percent for those in the highest.  
The survival probabilities for women increase from 79 percent in the lowest lifetime income 
quintile to 96 percent in the highest.   
 Figure 3b shows similar patterns for mortality to age 85 by lifetime income.3  The pattern 
for males is striking:  62 percent of the men in the highest lifetime income quintile live to 85 
(conditional on living to 75) while only 42 percent of those in the lowest quintile live to 85.  The 
gradient exists but is less strong for women.   
 To summarize, there is a clear relationship between lifetime income and survival. There are 
many likely explanations for the patterns.  We write down and solve a model that captures 
several of these explanations, though we do not model differences in innate ability to produce 
health capital.  Households in the model have different, exogenous draws on annual earnings, 
and hence different lifetime incomes.  They differ in the timing of exogenous marriage and 
fertility.  Given differences in incomes and demographic characteristics, they will respond to 
health shocks (which vary by lifetime income), earnings shocks, and government programs in 
different ways.  Moreover, we allow consumption and health to be gross complements or gross 
substitutes in utility.  The work that follows, therefore, illuminates the channels through which 
health, consumption, and wealth are related.   
 
 
3 Differential mortality is clearly a concern.  Men and women in lower lifetime income quintiles are 
disproportionately likely to die at an early enough age to never appear in the analysis sample for surviving to age 85.  
This leaves the survivors in the low lifetime income quintiles stronger, healthier than the typical household prior to 
the within-quintile mortality.   
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II.  Model 
 We assume the household maximizes utility by choosing consumption and health 
investments: 
( )/ , , .β −
=
 
 
 
∑
D
j S
j j j j j
j S
E n U c n l h  
The expectation operator E  denotes the expectation over future earnings uncertainty and 
uncertainty in health expenditures over life span, β is the discount rate, j is age, S is the age that 
a household member entered the labor market, D is the oldest age that people can live to, c is 
consumption, and h stands for health and l stands for leisure.  jn  represents the equivalent 
number of adults in the household and is a function of the number of adults, A, and children, K, 
in the household ( , )j jg A K .  
 Life span is endogenous in this model, following the work of Grossman (1972).   
Specifically, we assume that the household possesses a health stock and investments in health 
can prolong life.   The accumulation process of the stock of health is given by   
{ }1 ( , ) (1 ) ,   ,... .j j j j j jh i m i h j Sδ ε+ = + − + ∈  
The above equation shows the evolution of health status across ages.  The stock of health in the 
next age is determined by investments in health, denoted by ( , ) :j ji m i  investments in health are 
augmented both by direct medical expenditures and time investments in health capital.  
Households spend an indivisible amount of time ω working each period and spend the rest of 
their time endowment 1 ω−  on either leisure or on activities that augment health investments. 
Upon retirement, households split their time endowment of 1 unit between leisure and health 
investments.  Total medical expenditures jm  are a function ( )M ⋅  of out-of-pocket medical 
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expenses, oopjm .  jδ  stands for the depreciation rate of health.   Introducing age-dependent 
shocks to health is both realistic and necessary if we are interested in matching biological 
processes and the data. These age-dependent shocks are denoted by jε .  In typical lifecycle 
models, medical expenditures have only financial consequences.  Here medical expenditures 
affect health capital which, in turn, affects utility and longevity.  The modeling approach mimics 
the modeling of human capital – additions to human capital can be either consumption or 
investment as in Becker (1964), Mincer (1974) and the subsequent, vast human capital literature. 
 We are able to examine the effects of policy on longevity by modeling health.  The 
probability of surviving into the next period is given by the function Ψ(h).  This function satisfies 
two properties.  As h goes to ∞, Ψ(h) converges to 1.  Second, Ψ(h)=0 for h≤0.  This ensures that 
as soon as h goes to zero, the household dies.  Finally, note that health status affects utility 
directly. 
 Consumption and the age of retirement are chosen to maximize expected utility subject to 
the constraints,  
{ }= + + ∈( , , , ),   ,..., ,j j j j j jy e ra T e a j n j S R  
( ) { }
= =
 
= + + + ∈ + 
 
∑ ∑( , , , , ),   1,..., ,
R R
j j R j R R j j j
j S j S
y SS e DB e ra T e e a j n j R D  
( ) { }τ++ + = + − + ∈1 , ,..., ,j j j j j j jc a m y a e ra j S R  
( ) { }τ+
=
  
+ + = + − + + ∈ +     
∑1 , 1,...,
R
j j j j j j R j
j S
c a m y a SS e DB e ra j R D . 
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In these expressions y is income, e is earnings, a is assets, r is the interest rate, T is a transfer 
function, and R is the age of retirement.  Social security (SS) is a function of lifetime earnings, 
defined benefit pensions (DB) are a function of earnings in the last year of life, τ is a payroll and 
income tax function, and the transfer function for retirees ( )RT  is a function of Social Security, 
DB pensions, assets, age, and family structure.   
Retired Household's Dynamic Programming Problem 
 A retired household after age R obtains income from Social Security, defined benefit 
pensions, and preretirement assets. The dynamic programming problem at age j for a retired 
household is given by 
{ }( , , , , ) max ( / ,1 , ) ( ) ( , , , 1, ) ( )R R R RV e E a j h nU c n i h h V e E a j h dβ ε′= − + Ψ + Ξ∫  
subject to 
( )= + + +( ) ( , , , , )R R j R R Ry SS E DB e ra T e E a j n  
( )τ′+ + = + − +( ), ( )oop R Rc a m y a SS E DB e ra  
( ( ), ) (1 )oop hh F M m i hδ ε′ = + − +  
 In the above equation the value function, ( , , , , )R RV e E a j h , denotes the present discounted 
value of maximized utility from age j until the date of death, the ′ superscript denotes the 
corresponding value in the following year; and, as noted before, Ψ(h) denotes the probability of 
survival between ages j and j+1 for the husband and the wife respectively. oopm are out-of-pocket 
medical expenses.  Total earnings up to the current period are denoted by RE  while the last 
earnings draw at the age of retirement is Re . Note that these values do not change once the 
household is retired. 
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Working Household's Dynamic Programming Problem 
 A working household between the ages S and R obtains income from labor earnings and 
preretirement assets. The dynamic programming problem at age j for a working household is 
given by 
{ }1( , , , , ) max ( / ,1 , ) ( ) ( , , , 1, ) ( )V e E a j h nU c n i h h V e E a j h dω β ε− ′ ′ ′= − − + Ψ + Ξ∫  
subject to 
= + + ( , , , )y e ra T e a j n  
( )τ′+ + = + − +oopc a m y a e ra  
( ( ), ) (1 )oop hh F M m i hδ ε′ = + − +  
 1( , , , , )V e E a j h− denotes the present discounted value of maximized utility from age j.  
E₋₁ are cumulative earnings up to the current period.  The other variables are defined above. 
III.  Data  
 A critical input to our calculations is household earnings.  We start with individual earnings, 
which, after adjusting missing and top-coded observations, we aggregate for households.  
Earnings data come from three sources: Social Security Administration Summary Earnings files, 
SSA earnings detail files (W-2 information), and HRS self-reports.  We added new earnings data 
through 2007 using the 2009 SSA Summary Earnings file. 
 Earnings in the Summary Earnings files are top-coded.  To “undo” top-coding, we first 
check to see if W-2 earnings records exist; these data are available for most respondents starting 
in 1978.  If W-2 data are not available, HRS self-reports of earnings are used (if available).   
 The remaining top-coded earnings observations are split into two windows, 1951-1977 and 
1978-2007.  In the first period no top-coded earnings are recovered from W-2 or HRS data.  We 
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then estimate a censored regression model to predict the top-coded earnings in each year using 
the following covariates: gender, education, birth year, race, Census region, marital status, 
average percentile in the earnings distribution over the past 5 years (if available), average 
percentile in the earnings distribution over the next 5 years (if available), number of children in 
the household, total years reported working, and average real household wealth over the HRS 
study years (1992, 1994, …2008).  The covariates are drawn from the first wave the respondent 
appears in the HRS. 
 In the second window, 1978 – 2007, we recover many top-coded earnings observations from 
W-2 data.  We then estimate an earnings model with the same covariates mentioned previously, 
using the high-income observations that were recovered from the W-2 and HRS data.  We use 
these estimates to predict earnings for the high-income observations that remain top-coded.  We 
add a new covariate in 1992, labor force status, and the covariates used for prediction are taken 
from the nearest HRS interview.  
 Missing earnings are filled in when possible using HRS responses.  Missing earnings in 
years following the respondent’s last year of work or retirement year are set to zero.  Missing 
earnings are set to zero for respondents who report never having worked.  Missing earnings for 
respondents younger than age 17 are also set to zero.  The remaining missing earnings are 
imputed via an earnings model using most of the variables listed above.  The difference is that 
instead of using their point in the earnings distribution, the respondent’s average real earnings in 
the past/next five years was used when available. 
 After aggregating individual earnings to the household level, we combine earnings with data 
on household demographics, work history and pension status. 
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 For analytic tractability we assume earnings are exogenous and therefore unaffected by 
changes in policy.  While this assumption is strong, decision rules in the model and underlying 
data are household-specific.  In particular, income in the model is a precise measure of annual 
household income drawn from Social Security earnings records.  These income observations 
reflect all shocks the household received (including health and marital shocks) that affect 
income.  Hence, the income data we use reflects the full array of health shocks households 
receive over their lifetime, their investments in health-related activities, and all other factors 
affecting income draws.  What we do not accommodate at this point in our research program is 
for counterfactual policy changes to affect the incomes households receive. 
Social Security 
 We estimate the household’s expected Social Security benefit using the earnings history for 
each household member.  We take into account changes over time in the Social Security rules  
(e.g., full retirement age, penalty for early claiming, credit for late claiming, and breakpoints 
used in the determination of primary insurance amount) so that each household forms 
expectations about Social Security benefits that reflect the rules in place at the time the 
household head reaches their retirement age. 
IV.  Model Parameterization and Calibration 
 In this section, we specify functional forms and parameter values that we use to solve the 
model. We start by specifying functional forms for utility and health production. We then set 
some parameter values based on information from the literature or from reduced form estimates 
from the HRS. We identify the other model parameters by fitting the predictions of the model for 
the average household to data on wealth accumulation, medical expenses and survival 
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probabilities. Once we have these parameter values, we then solve the model household-by-
household to examine predictions for every household in our sample. 
Preferences 
 We assume that a household’s utility function takes the form 
( )
1
1 (1 )
( , )
1
c l h
u c h
γ
ρ ρη η ρλ λ
γ
−
− + −  =
−
.   The elasticity of substitution between the consumption-
leisure composite and health is ( )
1
1 ρ−
.  The parameter γ  is the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion.  Given that the choice of whether to invest in health and hence prolong life is 
endogenous, the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ  needs to be less than 1.  This guarantees 
that utility is a positive number.  Similar assumptions are made in the endogenous fertility 
literature.  The discount factor ( )β  is set at 0.96, a value similar to the 0.97 value used in 
Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995); and Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999).  We also set η
=0.36 from Cooley and Prescott (1995). 
Equivalence Scale  
 Like Scholz, Seshadri and Khitatrakun (2006) and Scholz and Seshadri (2010) we use an 
equivalence scale drawn from Citro and Michael (1995): 
 ( )0.7( , ) 0.7g A K A K= +  
where again, A indicates the number of adults and K indicates the number of children in the 
household. 
Rate of Return  
 We assume an annualized real rate of return ( )r of 4 percent. This assumption is consistent 
with McGrattan and Prescott (2003), who find that the real rate of return for both equity and debt 
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in the United States over the last 100 years, after accounting for taxes on dividends and 
diversification costs, is about 4 percent.  
Taxes  
 We model an exogenous, time-varying, progressive income tax that takes the form 
 ( )1 1
1
2( )
a ay a y y aτ
−
− = − + 
 
 
where y is in thousands of dollars. Gouveia and Strauss (1994, 2000) estimate the parameters 
1 2( ,  ,  and )a a a of the tax function using micro (or individual tax return data).  Their estimates 
characterize U.S. effective, average household income taxes between 1966 and 1989.   We need 
parameters for a longer period.  So we assembled data by aggregated income classes from 1950 
to 2008 using IRS data from the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service, 
available electronically through the Boston Public Library.  We used these data to estimate the 
parameters of the tax function in each year:  1950 to 2008. 
Earnings Process  
 Earnings expectations are a central influence on life-cycle consumption and health 
accumulation decisions, both directly and through their effects on expected pension and Social 
Security benefits.  We aggregate individual earnings histories into household earnings histories. 
The household model of log earnings (and earnings expectations) is 
 ( ) 21 2log ij j j je AGE AGE uα β β= + + +  
 1j j ju uρ ε−= +  
where, as mentioned above, jε  is the observed earnings of the household i at age j in 2004 
dollars, iα  is a household specific constant, jAGE  is age of the head of the household, ju  is an 
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AR(1) error term of the earnings equation, and jε  is a zero-mean i.i.d., normally distributed error 
term. The estimated parameters are 1 2,  ,  ,   and .
i
εα β β ρ σ  
 We divide households into six groups according to marital status, education and the number 
of earners in the household, resulting in six sets of household-group-specific parameters.4  The 
parameters for each of these six groups are estimated separately for the five HRS cohorts. 
 We estimate a similar medical expense expectation function using parameters of an out-of-
pocket medical expense function for each of four different household types (single vs. married, 
college vs. no college).   
 For households receiving a defined benefit pension we estimate a DB pension expectation 
function based on parameters of a function giving the annual value of pension benefits.   
Transfer Programs  
 One purpose of this paper is to assess the importance of factors affecting health and 
household wealth, including the safety net. We model public income transfer programs using the 
specification in Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995). Specifically, the transfer that a household 
receives while working is given by 
 [ ]{ }max 0, (1 )T c e r a= − + +  
whereas the transfer that the household receives upon retiring is 
 [ ]{ }max 0, ( ) ( ) (1 )R RT c SS E DB e r a= − + + +  
This transfer function guarantees a pre-tax income of c , which captures the value of 
AFDC/TANF, food stamps and Medicaid received by a family with no income.  Moffitt (2002) 
4 The groups are (1) married, head without a college degree, one earner; (2) married, head without a college degree, 
two earners; (3) married, head with a college degree, one earner; (4) married, head with a college degree, two 
earners; (5) single with college degree; and (6) single without a college degree. A respondent is an earner if his or 
her lifetime earnings are positive and contribute at least 20 percent of the lifetime earnings of the household. 
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provides estimates for the years 1960, 1964, 1968 to 1998.  We extended this series through 
2008 by gathering data on government aid programs through 2008 from a variety of sources 
(Urban Institute, Mathematica Policy Research Inc., Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
a database compiled by James Ziliak at the University of Kentucky).  These data are at the state 
level so we take a weighted average based on state population in each year. 
 Subsistence benefits for a one-parent family with two children increased sharply, from 
$5,992 in 1968 to $9,887 in 1974 (all in 1992 dollars). Benefits have trended down from their 
1974 peak – in 1992 the consumption floor was $8,159 for a one-parent, two-child family. 
Following Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, this formulation implies that earnings, retirement 
income, and assets reduce public benefits dollar for dollar. 
Health production 
 We assume that the production of health is given by the iso-elastic form 
( )( ) ( )1, ,  where ( ).oop oopF M m i m i m M mξχ χ−= =   Recall that i  denotes time allocated to the 
production of health capital.  Total medical expenditures are related to out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures by a linear function that varies by insurance status.  Specifically, we calibrate the 
( )oopm mς=  function for those under and over 65.  The categories include any private under 65, 
public only under 65, and uninsured under 65; and for those over 65, Medicare only, Medicare 
plus private insurance; and Medicare plus other public insurance. 
Survival Probability  
 The probability of surviving into the next period is given by the function ( ).hΦ  We assume 
this function satisfies two properties.  As h goes to∞ , ( )hΦ  converges to 1.  Second, 
( ) 0,  0,h hΦ = ≤  which ensures that as soon as h goes to zero, the household dies.  Finally, note 
that health status also affects utility directly.   
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 Health Shocks  
 At each age, we assume that there are two possible values for the health shocks: hε  and lε .  
The first shock hε  corresponds to being healthy and is set to zero.  The magnitude of the health 
shock lε  is determined by the calibration procedure.  The probability of the second shock is 
assumed to vary by age:  55 65 75 85 100, ,  ,  ,  and p p p p p refer to probabilities of `bad' health shocks 
between the ages of 0-55, 55-65, 65-75, 75-85 and over 85 respectively. 
V.  Calibration 
 While many parameters are set based on estimates from the literature or by estimating 
reduced form empirical models from the HRS, additional critical parameters still need to be 
specified. We use information on asset holdings, life tables and average medical expenses for the 
average household in the HRS to pin down these parameters. The parameters we calibrate are 
l,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  hλ ρ γ ψ θ ξ ε χ δ 55 65 75 85 100, ,  ,  ,  and p p p p p .
5   To calculate these remaining 
parameters, we solve the dynamic programming problem for the average household - the 
household with average earnings over their lifetime. We then use the decision rules in 
conjunction with observed histories of earnings to obtain model predictions.  To match moments 
on total medical expenses, we integrate out the lifetime sequence of health shocks before arriving 
at the model predictions for a given age.  We then seek to obtain the best fit between model and 
5 To remind readers, these are λ (the utility weight on consumption relative to health), ρ (determines the elasticity of 
substitution between consumption and health), γ (the coefficient of relative risk aversion), ψ (the coefficient on 
health in the survival function), θ (the curvature of the survival function with respect to health), ξ (the curvature of 
the health production function), lε  (the magnitude of the "bad" health shock), χ (the share parameter in health 
production between monetary and time inputs), hδ (the annual depreciation rate of health), and 
55 65 75 85 100, ,  ,  ,  and p p p p p  (the probabilities of bad health shocks occurring at different age intervals). 
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data relative to the moments we seek to match.  The moments we use to identify and pin down 
the parameters are: 
1.  Mean net worth in 1998 (age 65.3):     $346,221 
2.  Probability of dying age 54 and under:     0.62% 
3.  Probability of dying 60-64:       4.34% 
4.  Probability of dying 70-74:       9.84% 
5.  Probability of dying 75-79:       11.84% 
6.  Probability of dying 80-84:       19.35% 
7.  Probability of dying 90-94:       41.73% 
8.  Probability of dying in the next 5 years for those 95 and older:  72.73% 
9.  Average total medical expenses under age 18-44:    $2,974 
10.  Average total medical expenses for ages50-54 :   $4,974 
11.  Average total medical expenses for ages 60-64:    $8,472 
12.  Average total medical expenses for ages 70-74:    $9,083 
13.  Average total medical expenses for ages75-79:    $10,006 
14.  Average total medical expenses for ages 80 and older:   $10,511 
 
 Essentially, this represents 14 non-linear equations in 14 unknowns. We obtained an exact 
match between the model predictions and the moments above and the resulting parameter values 
are given in the Table below. 
Parameter Value 
λ  0.81 
ρ  -6.8 
γ  0.83 
ψ  0.0013 
θ  1.68 
ξ  0.75 
lε  -15.3 
χ  0.51 
hδ  0.049 
55p  0.05 
65p  0.10 
75p  0.135 
85p  0.186 
100p  0.239 
 Notice that λ  is less than 1 and the resulting preferences are close to logarithmic.  Recall 
that this parameter needs to be less than unity to guarantee that utility is a strictly positive 
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number.  Next, the elasticity of substitution between consumption (more precisely, the composite 
of consumption and leisure) and health is 1 0.13
1 ρ
=
−
.  Consumption and health are 
complements, as found by Murphy and Topel (2006) and Finkelstein, Luttmer, and Notowidigdo 
(2009).  The rate of depreciation of health is around 5.6 percent.  The share of goods in the 
production of health χ  is 0.51, suggesting that time and goods are both important in the 
production of health.  A bad health shock, ,lε  takes on the value -15.3:  recall that a good health 
shock, ,hε  is set to 0.  Finally, note that the probability of a bad health shock increases from 
around 5 percent for households below 55 years of age to 10 percent for households between 55 
and 65, to 13.5 percent for households between 65 and 75, to 18.6 percent for households 
between 75 and 86 and to 23.9 percent for households above the age of 85.  
Model Solution 
 Once we have the calibrated parameters, we solve the dynamic programming problem by 
linear interpolation on the value function.  For each household in our sample, we compute 
optimal decision rules for consumption (and hence asset accumulation) and health investments 
from the oldest possible age (this is endogenous) to the beginning of working life (S) for any 
feasible realizations of the random variables:  earnings and health shocks.  These decision rules 
differ for each household, since each faces stochastic draws from different earnings distributions 
(recall that this is household specific).  Household-specific earnings expectations also directly 
influence expectations about Social Security and pension benefits.  Other characteristics also 
differ across households.  Consequently, it is not sufficient to solve the life-cycle problem for 
just a few household types. 
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 VI.  Results 
 As described above, we calibrate key model parameters to the average household in the 
data.  A first check of the usefulness of the model we develop is to examine its ability to match 
the distribution of outcomes observed in the data.  We focus on the ability of the model to match 
the data on asset accumulation and medical expenditures, examining median values by lifetime 
income.  Lifetime income is defined within four roughly equal-sized age groups:  under 60, 60 to 
65, 66 to 75, and over 75.  This relationship is given in the table below. 
 
Table 1:  Model Predictions and Data on Net Worth and Total Medical Expenditures, 
2008 dollars 
 Median Net Worth Median Total Medical Expenses 
 Data Model Data Model 
Bottom Lifetime Quintile $32,947 $24,357 $5,682 $5,963 
Second Quintile 63,129 49,583 6,219 6,647 
Third Quintile 116,396 91,980 7,062 7,512 
Fourth 198,596 143,261 9,146 9,452 
Highest 355,106 315,983 11,337 12,034 
 
 
 The model does a credible job matching the wide variation in wealth.  Like Scholz, 
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006), households on average appear to accumulate more wealth than 
the model suggests is optimal.  Simultaneously, the model is able to match to account for the 
rather large disparities in medical spending across lifetime income quintiles, from close to 
$6,000 for the lowest quintiles to a little more than $12,000 for the top quintile annually.  The 
upshot is that the model is capable of explaining a great deal of the dispersion in health 
investments and wealth that we observe. 
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Mortality 
 
 A novel feature of our economic model is that it allows us to examine the effects of policy 
changes on mortality.  But the confidence readers have with our mortality results will depend, in 
part, on the ability of the model to reproduce mortality patterns in the HRS.  To examine 
mortality, we take 10-year mortality probabilities in the HRS for two groups – those who are 60 
years old and those who are 75 years old.  To implement this in the HRS (for the case of 60 year 
olds), we took everyone who entered the HRS in 1992, 1994 or 1996 who were in the age range 
58 to 62.  We then examine their mortality over the subsequent 10 years.  We then make similar 
calculations for the age 75 sample.  The entries in the table below under "Data" give the survival 
probabilities by lifetime income quintile.6   
Table 2:  Ten-year Survival Probabilities, HRS Data and Model 
 Age 60 Age 75 
 Data Model Data Model 
Bottom Lifetime Quintile 0.77 0.74 0.5 0.5 
Second Quintile 0.82 0.79 0.52 0.51 
Third Quintile 0.86 0.83 0.52 0.55 
Fourth 0.90 0.85 0.63 0.57 
Highest 0.93 0.87 0.65 0.60 
 
 The mortality calculations implied by the model require considerable calculation.  We take 
all 60 year olds.  These households face many different patterns of potential health shocks.  We 
integrate out over all potential sequences between the ages 60 and 70 and calculate the mass of 
survivors.  These calculations require, of course, the optimal decision rules over the lifetime of 
households.  We make similar calculations for households age 75.  The mortality rates implied 
by the model are given in Table 2 under the column "Model."   
6 These numbers from the HRS data are simply the population averages of the gender-specific survival probabilities 
plotted in Figures 3a and 3b. 
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 The model does a good job matching mortality patterns in the underlying data, though seven 
of the 14 moments that we calibrate the model to tie down mortality probabilities by age for 
households with average lifetime incomes.  This does not, however, imply that we would expect 
the model to reproduce mortality patterns for high- or low-lifetime income quintile households.  
The most important deviations between mortality data and predictions occur for households in 
the highest lifetime income quintiles.  These are likely to be the households that are most 
efficient in producing health capital. 
What is the effect of Medicare on longevity? 
 
 We now use the model to examine the effects of removing our stylized version of 
Medicare,7 the universal social insurance program that was established in 1965 to provide health 
insurance to the elderly.  There are several reasons why we focus on this policy.  First, Medicare 
is a large social insurance program costing $486 billion in fiscal year 2007.  Second, end-of-life 
health shocks have been shown by several authors to have significant effects on asset 
accumulation.  Third, Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) show, for example, that in the first 10 
years following the establishment of Medicare, there was no discernible effect on mortality.  The 
effects of policy changes on mortality and asset accumulation in the short- and long-run are 
issues the model is nicely designed to address. 
 The policy experiment that we model is extreme, in the sense that Medicare taxes are still 
collected but benefits are eliminated.  This scenario is nevertheless useful as it illustrates the 
point that health capital takes time to build up – the short-run responses to policy can differ 
substantially from long-run policies.8  Suppose that Medicare were instantly eliminated (but 
taxes are not changed and there are no general equilibrium effects from changes in the 
7 Specifically, the age-dependent health shocks in the model do not reduce directly the resources available for 
consumption and health investments for those covered by Medicare (those over 65 in the model in 2008).   
8 As our work develops, we will develop more refined versions of the policy experiments. 
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government’s fiscal position).  Moreover, we assume the change was not anticipated, so the 
assets and health capital that households have accumulated were acquired under the assumption 
that Medicare would exist. After eliminating Medicare, we can re-compute the model and 
examine the effects on 10-year survival probabilities. 
Table 3:  Immediate Ten-Year Survival Probabilities After Eliminating Our Stylized 
Version of Medicare Benefits 
 Age 60 Age 75 
 Baseline No Medicare Baseline No Medicare 
Bottom Lifetime Quintile 0.74 0.73 0.50 0.49 
Second Quintile 0.79 0.77 0.51 0.50 
Third Quintile 0.83 0.82 0.55 0.54 
Fourth 0.85 0.85 0.57 0.57 
Highest 0.87 0.86 0.60 0.59 
 
 As can be seen from Table 3, the short-run effects on mortality of eliminating the stylized 
Medicare are trivially small, despite the extreme nature of the policy.  This suggests the 
possibility that much of the influence that Medicare has on health outcomes occurs through 
decisions households make about their health capital well before they reach age 60.  Indeed, 
since most accumulation of health capital and wealth occurs well before retirement, health status 
is largely fixed by age 60-65.  Medicare in the model, therefore, has little effect on health in the 
years immediately following its repeal.  While Medicare provides insurance against adverse 
health shocks in old age so its elimination is costly to household consumption, our mortality 
results are consistent with the empirical findings of Finkelstein and McKnight:  eliminating 
Medicare has a small effect on 10-year survival probabilities immediately following repeal in our 
model. 
The long-run effect of Medicare repeal 
 
 We now look at the long-run effect of repealing Medicare, comparing model predictions for 
assets and survival in worlds with and without Medicare.  In the context of our model, this means 
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we compute lifetime decisions of households where they correctly understand that there is no 
Medicare.  The lifetime budget constraints of households in the previous and current simulations 
are the same – households in the model have the same exogenous earnings.  In the short-run 
simulation, they reach retirement only to learn that the program does not exist (contrary to 
expectations).  In this simulation they understand from the beginning of their working life that 
there is no social insurance program that covers health shocks in old age. 
 We first look at long-run mortality patterns.  Medicare repeal now has a large effect on 
survival probabilities, particularly in the lowest lifetime income quintile.  In the long-run, a 
forward-looking household with low lifetime income recognizes they have no health insurance 
program in retirement.  They also correctly anticipate the lifecycle pattern of health shocks and 
the cumulative effects of health depreciation, so old-age health status will be worse than health 
status at younger ages.  Because health and consumption are complements, the life-cycle pattern 
of consumption mirrors the lifecycle pattern of health.  Low lifetime income households will 
therefore invest less in health, trading off a shorter expected lifespan for greater consumption in 
younger ages when the marginal utility of consumption is high relative to later in life.  High 
lifetime income households mitigate these effects by self-insuring:  they engage in buffer stock 
saving and invest in health capital. 
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 Table 4a:  Long-Run Ten-Year Survival Probabilities After Eliminating Our Stylized 
Version of Medicare Benefits 
 Age 60 Age 75 
 Baseline No Medicare Baseline No Medicare 
Bottom Lifetime Quintile 0.74 0.66 0.50 0.43 
Second Quintile 0.79 0.72 0.51 0.47 
Third Quintile 0.83 0.79 0.55 0.50 
Fourth 0.85 0.83 0.57 0.56 
Highest 0.87 0.86 0.60 0.59 
 
 The effects of this experiment on wealth are somewhat surprising to us, and perhaps 
influenced substantially by our modeling of insurance transitions.  This reflects the preliminary 
nature of the work.  In the long-run simulations, we anticipated that some households would 
engage in aggressive buffer stock saving, since they would need to self-insure given there is no 
social insurance program that would provide health insurance in old age.  While in Table 4b 
below we see greater wealth accumulation, particularly in the lowest lifetime income quintiles, 
the magnitude of the effects is considerably smaller than we anticipated.  Similarly, we do not 
see large effects on optimal medical expenditures across lifetime income quintiles.  We think a 
computational simplification we have made has a potentially large effect on the long-run results 
shown in Tables 4a and 4b.  Many households in the model are under 65 (roughly half the 
sample is under 65).  Most of these households have employer-provided insurance.  As we have 
modeled the problem, they retain their insurance status for their entire lives, thus avoiding the 
need to add another state variable to the model (insurance status).  Adding state variables is 
computationally demanding.  Hence, fewer households are modeled as being affected by 
eliminating Medicare than ideally should be, particularly in the upper lifetime income quintiles.  
As our research develops further, we will address this model limitation.  Even with this 
specification, however, two points are clear – health capital is built over time.  Much of one’s 
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health at older ages reflects investments and decisions made at earlier ages.  Second, policy 
changes may have substantially different effects in the short and long run.  In particular, 
adaptations in the long run can affect consumption and health investment, which in turn may 
affect longevity. 
 
Table 4b:  Long-Run Model Predictions and Data on Net Worth and Total Medical 
Expenditures, 2008 dollars, After Eliminating Medicare 
 Median Net Worth Median Medical Expenses 
 Baseline No Medicare Baseline No Medicare 
Bottom Lifetime Quintile $24,357 $56,472 $5,963 $2,332 
Second Quintile 49,583 75,786 6,647 4,147 
Third Quintile 91,980 121,213 7,512 6,231 
Fourth 143,261 182,093 9,452 8,139 
Highest 315,983 342,104 12,034 11,234 
 
The Long-run Effects of Social Security 
 The final thought experiment is designed to further our understanding of the effect of Social 
Security on mortality and asset accumulation.  In our model, Social Security has two distinctive 
features relative to Medicare.  First, it is not a tied transfer – Social Security benefits are not 
targeted at medical expenses and may be used by the household to enhance consumption or 
longevity.  Second, the benefit structure of Social Security ensures it has a larger redistributive 
component than Medicare.  In the tables below, we present the effect of eliminating the Social 
Security system on longevity and on net worth and medical expenses. 
 Like the Medicare simulations, the Social Security experiments are extreme versions of 
policy.  Namely, earnings do not adjust, so, in a modeling sense, households continue to pay 
Social Security taxes but simply do not receive any benefits.  The lifetime resources shock to low 
lifetime income households is larger (in a relative sense) than it is to high lifetime income 
households as a consequence of Social Security’s redistributive component.  In subsequent 
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simulations, we will model the effects of Social Security on wealth and longevity assuming the 
incidence of Social Security taxes is borne fully by workers.  Then earnings over the working life 
will be higher by the amount of Social Security taxes people pay.  Social Security will still have 
subtle behavioral effects in this reformulated simulation, since the market failures we model – 
the absence of complete insurance markets and borrowing constraints – will affect households’ 
responses to eliminating Social Security in a balanced-budget sense.  But the more extreme 
policy simulation we model here helps clarify channels at work in our behavioral model. 
 
Table 5a:  Long-Run Ten-Year Survival Probabilities After Eliminating Our Stylized 
Version of Social Security 
 Age 60 Age 75 
 Baseline No SS Baseline No SS 
Bottom Lifetime Quintile 0.74 0.70 0.50 0.46 
Second Quintile 0.79 0.75 0.51 0.48 
Third Quintile 0.83 0.79 0.55 0.52 
Fourth 0.85 0.84 0.57 0.56 
Highest 0.87 0.87 0.60 0.60 
 
 
Table 5b:  Long-Run Model Predictions and Data on Net Worth and Total Medical 
Expenditures, 2008 dollars, After Eliminating Social Security 
 Median Net Worth Median Medical Expenses 
 Baseline No SS Baseline No SS 
Bottom Lifetime Quintile 24,357 41,103 5,963 4,495 
Second Quintile 49,583 64,039 6,647 5,156 
Third Quintile 91,980 106,423 7,512 6,920 
Fourth 143,261 156,938 9,452 8,825 
Highest 315,983 327,351 12,034 11,663 
 
 When Social Security is eliminated, households increase their private savings to smooth 
consumption across time.  At the same time, poor households experience a drop in income by 
more than their richer counterparts.  Hence, the negative income effect leads to a cutback in 
medical spending.  This leads to higher mortality at both age 60 and at age 75.  We are anxious 
to explore the degree to which changes in health investments mitigate the consumption responses 
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to transfer policy changes.  Lifecycle models in the literature do not endogenize health 
investment, so all household responses to policy occur through changes in precautionary saving.  
These responses are overstated when households can adjust by altering their health investments 
or labor supply (including retirement dates).  In subsequent work, we will further expand our 
model to account for these responses. 
VII.  Conclusions 
 Our research program is still a work in progress, so we want to be careful to not over-reach 
in drawing conclusions from our work to date.  We nevertheless think our modeling suggests 
four things.  First, it is computationally feasible to embed a Grossman-style model of health 
capital into an augmented lifecycle model of consumption.  Doing so allows us to study two 
behavioral responses that to date have not been explored:  the tradeoff between consumption and 
health investments and the effects of policy on longevity.  Existing models will overstate the 
effects of policy on consumption/saving/wealth by ignoring the likelihood that people may 
respond to adverse shocks by altering health investments (whether through direct expenditures or 
through their health-promoting investments of time).  
 Second, our model calibration implies consumption and health are complements.  This 
implies that as health depreciates with age, households will get less utility from consumption 
than would be in the case of a lifecycle model that does not endogenize health.  This result has 
implications for the timing of consumption over the lifecycle, and practical implications for the 
amount of wealth households will want to accumulate to maintain living standards in retirement.  
Indeed, these wealth targets will be lower than would occur in models without health-
consumption interactions. 
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 Third, while we need to be very cautious about the channel, due to the extreme nature of our 
policy experiments to date, it appears that forward-looking households, when confronted by a 
substantially reduced safety net, might respond both by reducing consumption and by reducing 
their health investment.  Indeed, in some very poor countries, it does not appear that households 
engage in substantial precautionary saving.  Instead, they largely run down their health capital.  
Large policy changes can affect survival probabilities of low lifetime income households. 
 Fourth, there is a potentially important difference between short- and long-run responses to 
policy.  Short-run changes in survival probabilities, even to very large policies affecting the 
elderly, appear to be small because health capital is largely determined by the time an individual 
reaches retirement.  Long-run changes can be substantial, however.  With fewer lifetime 
resources, households will both consume less and die earlier.  The consumption/saving responses 
in a model with endogenous health will be smaller than those in a model that ignores these 
channels.  But it provides a more complete understanding of policy by capturing effects on health 
and longevity as well as consumption. 
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